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2.2. Theoretical issues on risk management, banking fragility and 
market structure 
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2.3. Empirical studies on risk management, banking fragility and 
market structure 
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2.3.1. Banking firm behaviour and risk management practices 
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Table 3.1 Timing in the Basic Framework 
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Managerial strategy is pursued to 
allocate reserves and portfolio investment in an optimal way to maximise profits, but 
also to prevent financial distress given uncertainty on both sides of the banking 
balance sheets. 
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3.3.3. Profitability, the banking solvency function and the viability of the asset 
          transformation process  
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3.5. Conclusions and discussion 
1     


   	  
 		 			 
 		 	   	
	  	  
  
 




   	
  
   	




























#	  	 	   	     !	
   







		  	       

	
   !	  !





  	 D
   
















   
   	
    	
 
		   !   ! 




















   	   	   
 
		 
	   
	     	


 		    		   
	  
 










   		
 
 











"  #		   	  	 
   $  	 
	  






































   	   	 
  	  	 monopolistically competition  
competition  	
	monopolistically competition    		










   		  , '!-.!( / '!-.(  

 	 		 		 
 		 

	   



















  	 0  9 2
6




 	   	 
	    	   # 	    
	
	:		  	 	 
		 
	 
		 "	   	 		 	  institutional
competition, among monopolistically competitive intermediaries, enhances banking 
stability when the market size is relatively big













 	/   	 	  	  	 
	:  <
 
	 	  










  #  		 









 	   








































 "/,  		$ @  
		    B	 
	  	
	$   	  	    

	






 -(2 "	 









 *	     	 '!-34(  	 	 
 # 	   /,

 >
"	not only justify ALM practices		
		

















  	 		  
		 
 	  	
  C  	
 
		      		 	 
		   	

 	 	






		 		  	  complementary   		   

		 	# 		/ 		
	   	 		
   	


















 		     	  
 	  
		    
 






	 		  
		

  	   	 	  
		
	 " the maximisation of longterm profits and the minimisation of 








& '!-34(  *	     	 '!-34() 	 	  
 
	  	 	 1	  








 	   	 	 0 &  & '!-36(2  "
	 
 # 	 		 	
	
 	  	 0*	     	
'!-34(2  	E












	  	   

























 	      	

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4.2.1. Main assumptions and the expected benefit function with multiple    
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4.3. Banking decisions with uncertainty on both sides of the balance   
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Table 4.1 Comparative Static Analysis for the Basic Banking Model  
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Table 4.2 Comparative Static Analysis for the Model with Asset Uncertainty  
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4.4.2. Behavioural decisions with random deposit withdrawals 
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Table 4.3 Comparative Static Analysis for the Model with Liability Uncertainty  
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4.5. Market structure, uncertainty and behavioural banking decisions 
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Table 4.4 Comparative Static Analysis for the Banking Models  
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practices, fragility and market structure is justified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increase when intermediaries increase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4.6. Conclusions and discussion 
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Table 5.1 Comparative Static Analysis for the Regulation Model  
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controls can be more effective than required reserve ratios to enhance stability, at 











 			  	
! 	  
	  
  	"
	  	   
	  
  " 	!
 
 9  " "   !  	
		very high controlled interest rates will induce intermediaries to take risks 






Table 5.2 Comparative Static Analysis for the Regulation Model  
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5.4. Behavioural and control risk effects, market structure and the 
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Table 5.3  Behavioural and Control Risk Effects 
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
 "
		
3' 	 	  !		
	
  !  		 	
		'	 the traditional 
timeconsistency dilemma can be extended to include an inverse relationship between 
liquidity insurance and the viability of the intermediation process

@  ! 	 	  
  	  
!   	<

  		 
 ! 
	 
	   
		   	  	  
	"   	!" 
 	   
  
	












	   +		   




















   	!"  	"

 	 #  regulatoryrisk 
	 	  
	  
	 		
   ! 	!























			   !     	!








! !	  	





	     
"	 	 











	 	> 	  
























	    
  	 !! 		 !
 	!
 # 	 
	   









	  ! 		  				  

		  	> !  












  !	 	  
 	  
  
 	  
  	





   	!
 		 










		  "   			 /  	3)   	
		
  	"  / 3 % 	!
 	 
!  	 		
  " 	!


















	!	!		 { }[ ]Mh xxxx ≤≤ I 
' 	   !  	!	  { }[ ]Mh xxxx ≤≤− I  ' 	 !!
   { } { }[ ]lh xxxxx ≥∪≤ II  ' 8 	  	!
 
  ( ) { } { }[ ]FLlMFHMh yyyxxxyyyxxxyx ≤≤≤≤∪≤≤≤≤ IIII KK  '












   	" 
 	 C!    
    	 
 	  	  
   
 '	 
  	  	  




  	   	      
:	" 


















 	  	! 
 
! 	 













! !	  












  	    	!











    
( ) { } { }[ ]FLlMFHMh yyyxxxyyyxxxyx ≤≤≤≤∪≤≤≤≤− IIII KK  @ 
	!! 					 { }[ ]Mh xxxx ≤≤ I 
{ }[ ]lM xxxx ≤≤ I 
2





N  	 
N 









  			 	   !		
' 	 !! 
 




  !  	  
 	
!	 	  
    	   





5.5.2. Banking competition and non regulated intermediaries 
7  
	   		  		     

  " 	 # 	 	
 		 
	
 !   "	 
	 
		 	     	
  " 	 # 	 	  
	  	
! 	   	  	  		  


	    
    	
	 !  
	












































	    	 !   	    '






	   	 
		    		      	!
   





























 increases in the number of perfectly competitive intermediaries reduce the 




































 	  
	 	"	 	
 






























 		  ! 	    	 if the banking 
system is perfectly competitive (implying that expected benefits are zero), fragility is 
enhanced when the number of intermediaries increases and the financial system is not 
regulatedOtherwise, assuming monopolistically competitive intermediaries, stability 
is enhanced. This conclusion holds, even when the depositsupply elasticity expands 
enough to guarantee nonnegative expected benefits among the perfectly competitive 
intermediaries. 
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 restrictive regulations will reduce the likelihood of solvency 
risk when the intermediaries are perfectly competitive. Otherwise, regulation will 
have the opposite effects.9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Table 5.4  Probabilistic Risk Effects on Liquidity and Solvency 
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5.6. Regulatory&risk effects on asset transformation viability and 
banking scenarios  
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Table 5.5  Probabilistic Risk Effects and Intermediation Process   
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Table 6.1 Financial Structure, Risk Management and Banking Fragility 
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6.3. Financial and banking indicators 
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6.3.1. Definition and construction 
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6.4. Stylised facts on financial development and financial and banking 
market structures 
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Table 6.8 Evidence on the Financial Structure Specification 
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Table 6.9 Evidence on the Financial Development Specification 
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Table 6.10 Evidence on the Financial Structure and Development Specification 
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Table 6.11 Evidence on the Banking Market Structure and Fragility Hypotheses 
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 	  	 financial development is associated to marketbased 
financial systems and to noncompetitive banking systems. 0 
				&+	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  that banking crises may encourage financial development  	
	 they may encourage the transformation of financial systems into marketbased 
ones& 	 	  	 	  	 have 
differentiated associations& 7
	  banking concentration and foreign
owned banks always seem to characterise bankbased and underdeveloped financial 
systems. ; 	  	  		  
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that banking crises are more likely 
in bankbased financial systems 	 	 financial development enhances banking 
stability&  	    
 	 	 	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evidence rejects the bankbased view& ; 	 
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banking 
competition seems to encourage banking fragility, but the particular effects of the 
individual market structure indicators may be differentiated&;
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7.3. Banking regulations, stability and the degree of banking 
competition 
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7.4. Financial systems and the design of stability.enhancing policies 
% 
 
	  	 
	






   	
		  	  





























































   
	
   	







































































































































































	 <	 	  
  










	 *	  #































































  	 
	 			




   	 

	  	 			


























  	 
 	 	
	
  	 	   
			 		 	 





   		#
	

	 	 			  
		   
	




























   	
#
   	

 	 






   		
   





   			

$	    
 

 	  













































































































 & 8.))'9D   































































-	   		
 









   	    
	    		 






	 	 !	 ,
	





































   
 	  
 












































  	  I    	
  		
A B G ;##&	
  >	
 8.)).C  '(9D &  G ;##
&	
>	




	  	 	 		 		  
	   	















































		   A B&
 >



























7.6. Concluding remarks 
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1. Appendix for Chapter 2 
 	
 dix we offer an introduction to banking risks and institutional risk 
management theory. Specifically, we describe the nature of the risks that banks 
normally deal to develop their activities and we offer an overview about how risk 
management has been integrated into financial models to explain intermediaries' 
activities. We concentrate on why risks and risk management are important to explain 
the behaviour of intermediaries, instead of concentrating in the traditional concern 
about how risk management techniques deal with risk. 1   
  
We show how intermediation theory has explained intermediaries’ behaviour in terms 
of the nature of their risk management activities. Theoretically, this approach makes us 
to explicitly assume an institutional perspective to analyse banking intermediaries. 
Moreover, it also offers the possibility to explain the observed behaviour of financial 
institutions in modern financial markets.  
 
The appendix is divided in two sections. The first section describes the relationship 
between banking risks and intermediation activities from the perspective of 
researchers and practitioners. The second one reviews the development of the 
institutional risk management models.  
 
1.A. Banking risks and intermediation activities 
Banking management concerns are related to liquidity, asset, liability and capital 
management considerations. Risks and risk management play a central role for 
financial decisions taking. Specifically, banking institutions have to control and select 
                                                           
1 Traditionally, the focus is on the how these individual factors explain the performance of 
intermediaries  [See Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) and Freixas and Rochet (1997)]. Interestingly, the 
risk management literature usually focuses on specific tools and models to deal with risk, but not in the 
institutional aspects of risk management. See Bessis (2002) and Hunter and Smith (2002).    
 180 
the risks inherent to the management of deposits, loans, portfolios of securities, and 
off2balance sheet contracts.2 
 
The scope of risk management practices is as diverse as the risks that banks face. 
These risks include micro2risks, like the ones concerning credit to individual 
borrowers; and macro2risks, such as market risks, interest rate and exchange rate risks, 
which may be well beyond the control of a single market participant. Roles associated 
to them, such as the provision of liquidity insurance and the search for profitable asset 
transformation activities, explain their exposition to this variety of risks. Thus, we 
believe that in order to study the risk management process we should start by 
classifying the types of banking risks. Given the scope and nature of the risks that 
these intermediaries face, several classifications have been proposed.  
 
Academically, risks can be divided according to their aggregation level, their balance 
sheet effects, or according to the banking2activity to which they are associated [Freixas 
and Rochet (1997)].  An aggregation2type economic classification differentiates 
between idiosyncratic and systemic risks3. An accounting2financial one differentiates 
between liquidity and solvency ones. Finally, an activity2association one distinguishes 
among credit2default, deposit2liquidity and market risks.4 
 
Practitioners and regulatory authorities usually classify market risks according to the 
techniques and management tools required for measuring, monitoring and controlling 
risks based on expectations of banking performance. Thus, they divide market risks in 
credit, liquidity (maturity), interest rate, foreign exchange, settlement, operational, 
legal, reputational, political and systemic risks [Sheng (1999)].5  Based on this 
classification, we distinguish between intermediary and nonintermediary risks. 
                                                           
2 Theoretically, it has been accepted that “the management of risks, in the full acceptation of the term, 
can be seen as the major activity of banks, as well as other financial intermediaries” [Freixas and Rochet 
(1997: p. 221)]. 
3 Idiosyncratic risks are microeconomic risks that can be diversified away by the law of large numbers, 
while systematic are macroeconomic ones that cannot. Notice that banks generally deal with both types 
of risks. Other intermediaries do not necessarily deal with both types. For example, insurance companies 
main concern is with idiosyncratic risks. 
4 Credit2default risk happens when borrowers are unable to repay a debt and the banking credit activity 
is affected. Deposit2liquidity risks occur when banks must pay unexpected deposit withdrawals. Market 
risks affect the portfolios of marketable assets and liabilities held by the banks.   
5 Heffernan (1996) develops a similar classification and a simplified one is described by Bessis (2002). 
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Intermediary risks are the banking risks associated directly to their main functions. 
Thus, these risks depend on creditors, liquidity provisions, interest and exchange rates, 
settlements and the operation of the bank itself. onintermediary risks are the ones 
that depend on external or intangible factors. These depend on the legal system, 
reputation, political environment and the perception of the financial markets 
(contagion effects). 
  
The relevance of the latter classification is related to current research frontiers. Theory 
still needs to address the analysis of intermediary risk areas like the ones concerning 
settlement and operational risks; while it needs to extend the analysis undertaken on 
non intermediary ones, like the one related to systemic risk.    
 
Concerning intermediary risks, Pyle (1997) has indicated that risks that result from 
costs carried out in carrying out settlement failures, failures to meet regulatory 
requirements or failures to properly monitor employees, usually are highly important 
for firms. About non2intermediary risks, Allen and Gale (2000b) have indicated that an 
important topic for further research is related to the kinds of arrangements that banks 
set up given uncertainty, the individual benefits of access to liquidity and the social 
costs of contagion.6  
 
1.B. Institutional risk management models  
Banking functions and intermediary activities depend on adequate risk management 
practices. Specifically, from the point of view of banking entrepreneurs, risk 
management activities provide the means to maximise profits and to minimise 
financial distress in the banking markets; while for regulators, they provide the means 
to allocate resources and to avoid fragility in the financial system. The relevance 
associated to these issues explains why financial research has long focused on risk 
management.    
 
Historically, the theory of financial risk management practices and financial 
intermediation can be dated back to Modigliani and Miller (1958). There it is shown 
                                                           
6 See Bougheas (1999) for a theoretical analysis of contagious bank runs. See Allen and Gale (2001) for 
a review on the bank contagion literature. 
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that, allowing arbitrage, the value of the firm is independent of how it manages its’ 
financial risk in an economy with perfect markets, zero bankruptcy costs and without 
taxes. The relevance of this paper is related to the justification of management 
rationales. Risk management matters when these conditions are not satisfied. Thus, 
since then management models include at least one of these conditions to rationalise 
the behaviour of financial intermediaries. 
 
One of the most important contributions to the development of institutional 
management theory refers to the analysis of intermediaries as firms. Among these 
contributions, the seminal works of Monti (1972) and Klein (1971) are relevant 
because they provide the foundations to the industrial organisation approach to 
intermediation theory. Specifically, their works analyse how monopolistic banks 
should determine their optimal lending and deposit decisions to maximise profits.  
Their contribution relates to the one of Leland (1972) and Sandmo (1971), who study 
the problem of how firms choose their investment and financing decisions given 
uncertainty and a maximisation utility function. The relevance of the latter papers 
relates to the development of the theory of the firm under uncertainty. 
    
More recent contributions are Ederington (1979) and Rolfo (1980). These papers 
examine the problem of hedging (off2balance sheet risk management) in the context of 
a firm that takes positions in off2balance sheet instruments to maximise a 
mean/variance objective function or expected utility. The main contribution of these 
analyses relies on the integration of the theory of the firm with the mean2variance 
analysis pioneered by Markowitz (1958) and Tobin (1958).  
 
Financial fragility theory has provided incentives for the development of institutional 
risk management theory. Following Bryant (1980), Diamond and Dybvig (1983) 
explain bank runs in terms of the financial structure of the intermediaries, deposit 
insurance and liquidity needs of depositors. Concretely, they show that bank runs are 
equilibrium outcomes when there is incomplete information about the timing of 
depositors’ liquidity requirements. This is important because this result is related to 
one of the main concerns of the risk management literature: The one regarding why 
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firms might want to manage risk in equilibrium or, in other words, the one about how 
risk management practices can be rationalised.  
 
Inter2temporal considerations can differentiate between solvency and liquidity risks, 
but also provide with the most accepted economic rationale for risk management: the 
prevention of financial distress [Allen and Santomero (1997), Scholtens and 
Wensdeen (2000)]. This is important because it answers why intermediaries may 
engage in risk management activities in terms of the fear of bankruptcy and the 
financial fragility phenomenon. However, this has not been the unique offered 
solution. Alternative proposed rationales for risk management in the context of 
financial intermediaries are managerial self2interest, non2linear taxes and capital 
market imperfections.7  
 
Hedging models provide further insight about risk management decisions. These 
models show how the firm’s management decisions are complicated by multiple 
sources of risks [Anderson and Danthine (1981)] and/or imperfect competitive 
markets [Morgan and Smith (1987)]. Along the lines of such models, Hunter and 
Smith (2002) analyse the hedging of future investment opportunities when the banking 
utility function is concave and the costs are convex. The relevance of these papers is 
that they suggest that bankruptcy costs, market structure, and multiple uncertainty may 
affect risk management practices.  
 
Recent risk management models focus on the simultaneous decisions regarding 
hedging and leverage. Leland (1998) studies the joint investment, hedging and 
leverage decisions in a dynamic value maximisation framework.  Mello and Parsons 
(2000) argue that the optimal hedging for a firm facing constraints is one that 
minimises the variability in the marginal value of cash balances. These papers 
determine the optimal demand of hedging given specific financial distress costs and 
the existence of risk neutral traders that provide free insurance.  Thus, their 
conclusions are limited in terms of applicability. However, the relevance of these 
papers is that they provide a departure point to study the dynamics of the risk 
management process. 
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2. Appendix for Chapter 4 
In this appendix we obtain the first order conditions, (4.4a) and (4.4b), necessary to 
obtain the optimal reserves to deposits ratio. Our goal will be to derive such conditions 
from the maximisation program (4.3) and the assumptions regarding market structure 
in order to show that risk management, liquidity and solvency depend on the 
characteristics of the deposit markets. We divide this appendix in two sections. In the 
first, the partial derivatives and FOC are obtained while in the second, we focus on the 
FOC for deposits and rewrite it in terms of market structure features.  
 
2.A. Partial derivatives and first order conditions 
We start by setting the partial derivatives of the program. Such partial derivatives are 
obtained deriving the expected benefit function using the Leibnitz’s rule for iterated 
integrals for the exterior one and the Leibnitz’s rule for differentiation of integrals for 
the ones inside the brackets.8  
 
The obtained partial derivative for reserves is: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
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          (2A.1) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
7 See Allen and Santomero (1997), for a review of the literature on these alternative rationales.  
8  Leibnitz’s rules for differentiation of integrals are: 








































































Simplifying this partial derivative and equating them to zero we obtain: 
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          (2A.2) 
This is equation (4.4a) in the text. 
 
Analogously, the following derivative for deposits is obtained.  
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Simplifying, we obtain the first order condition for deposits: 
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The last derivative can be rewritten as 
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2.B. Market structure and first order conditions 
Assuming identical banking firms and a deposit2supply function with constant deposit2
supply elasticity, we can define the identity below: 






















1       (2A.6) 
The RHS expression allows us to study the relationship between market structure, and 
banking deposit decisions. That is because the deposit derivatives can be rewritten in 
terms of the inverse elasticities with two limiting cases: N=1 (monopsony) and N=+∞ 
(perfect competition).  
 
Given the deposit2supply elasticity definition and symmetric banks, (2A.5) can be 
rewritten as:  
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3. Appendix for Chapter 5 
In this appendix we evaluate and analyse the behavioural and control2risk derivatives 
in both control models. Specifically, we determine the qualitative changes in the 
probabilistic ranges that define the likelihood of liquidity and solvency for 
intermediaries when the behavioural and control variables change. This evaluation is 
possible because the probabilistic ranges are defined by the liquidity cut2offs and the 
banking solvency function thresholds. Moreover, because of the inter2temporal 
framework used to design the models, the analysis can differentiate between the short2
term effects, associated to the viability of the asset transformation process, and the 
long2term ones, associated to the solvency and profitability of intermediaries.  
 
The appendix is divided in two sections. In the first section, the behavioural2risk and 
control2risk derivatives on the liquidity regulation model are obtained and analysed, 
while in the second one, does the same for the deposit2return regulation one.   
 
3.A. Behavioural and control&risk effects on the reserve&ratio control model 
In this section we analyse the behavioural2risk effects associated to changes in 
individual deposits and the control2risk effects associated to changes in liquidity ratios. 
Then we sign them to evaluate the risk effects on the reserve2ratio control model. 
Particularly, we write these derivatives in terms of the deposit2supply elasticity to 
analyse how market structure influences banking management goals.  
 
Behavioural&risk effects with reserve&ratio controls  
Here we analyse how deposits affect the probabilities associated to the inter2temporal 
risks through variations in the probabilistic ranges that define the viability, solvency 
and profitability of the asset transformation process.  
 
The short2term behavioural2risk derivatives are the following: 
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   (3A.1b) 
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    (3A.1d) 
The derivatives show that increases in deposits will reduce the probabilities of 
managing liquidity surpluses and shortages. This finding suggests that the viability of 
the asset transformation process will be reduced when individual deposits increase. 
However, this effect seems to depend on market size. Notice that the probabilities of 
financial failure will not change by increases in individual deposits when the banking 
system is not concentrated or when the depositors are sensitive. 
 
The long2term behavioural2risk derivatives are the following: 
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    (3A.2b) 
The derivatives show that increases in deposits will increase the probabilities of 
financial failure. This finding suggests that the solvency and profitability likelihood 
will be reduced when deposits increase. However, like in the short2term cases, these 
effects seem to depend on market size. Again, the derivatives show that the 
probabilities of failure will not change by increases in individual deposits when the 
banking system is not concentrated or when the depositors are sensitive. 
 
We conclude indicating that the viability, solvency and profitability likelihood of 
regulated intermediaries seems to decrease when individual deposits increase. 
However, the magnitude of these behavioural2risk effects seems to be inversely related 
to the intermediaries’ number and the deposit2supply elasticity. Therefore, it seems 
that market size and the likelihood of the asset transformation process for regulated 






Control&risk effects with reserve&ratio controls  
Here we analyse how reserve2ratio controls affect the probabilities associated to the 
inter2temporal risks through variations in the probabilistic ranges that define the 
viability, solvency and profitability of the asset transformation process.  
 
The short2term control2risk derivatives are the following: 
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      (3A.3d) 
The derivatives show that restrictive reserve2ratio controls will reduce the probabilities 
of managing liquidity surpluses and shortages. This finding suggests that the viability 
of the asset transformation process will be reduced when compulsory reserveratios 
are restrictive. Interestingly, the likelihood of early termination due to liquidity 
shortages seems to be reduced. These findings imply that regulators should consider 
the existence of trade2offs between the avoidance of shortage problems and the overall 
viability of the asset transformation process.    
 
The long2term control2risk derivatives are the following: 


















iLiF     (3A.4a) 
















iHiF     (3A.4b) 
Interestingly, the derivatives show that increases in controlled reserve2ratios will have 
mixed effects. Only for the case of liquidity shortages, such increases will reduce the 
probabilities of financial failure.  
 
The above finding confirms the existence of an inter2temporal trade2off from the 
regulators’ perspective. Restrictive reserve2ratio controls can reduce at a cost the 
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likelihood of financial fragility due to liquidity shortages. This cost will be the 
reduction of the likelihood of the overall viability of the asset transformation process 
and the reduction of the solvency and profitability likelihood in case of liquidity 
surpluses. 
 
3.B. Behavioural and control effects on the deposit&return control model 
In this section we analyse the behavioural2risk effects associated to changes in 
individual reserves and the control2risk effects associated to changes in deposit2
returns. Then we sign them, whenever possible, to evaluate the risk effects on the 
deposit2return control model. Particularly, we write these derivatives in terms of the 
deposit2supply elasticity to analyse how market structure influences banking 
management goals.  
 
Behavioural&risk effects with deposit&return controls  
Here we analyse how reserves affect the probabilities associated to the inter2temporal 
risks through variations in the probabilistic ranges that define the viability, solvency 
and profitability of the asset transformation process.  
 
The short2term behavioural2risk derivatives are the following: 
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   (3A.5d) 
The derivatives show that increases in reserves will reduce the probabilities of 
managing liquidity surpluses and shortages. This finding suggests that the viability of 
the asset transformation process will be reduced when reserves increase. However, 
the likelihood of early termination due to liquidity shortages seems to be reduced. 
Interestingly, it seems that banking firms face a dilemma similar to the one faced by 
regulators in the control model developed before: They should face a trade2off 
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between the avoidance of financial distress due to liquidity shortages and the overall 
viability of the asset transformation process.    
 
The long2term behavioural2risk derivatives are the following: 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )
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    (3A.6b) 
Again, the derivatives show that increases in reserves will have mixed effects. Only 
for the case of liquidity shortages, such increases will reduce the probabilities of 
financial failure. This behavioural2risk effect is similar to the one associated to 
regulators’ decision in the reserve2ratio control model. 
 
Control&risk effects with deposit&return controls  
Here we analyse how deposit2return controls affect the probabilities associated to the 
inter2temporal risks through variations in the probabilistic ranges that define the 
viability, solvency and profitability of the asset transformation process.  
 
The short2term control2risk effect derivatives are the following: 
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The derivatives show that increases in the deposit2return controls will increase the 
probabilities of financial failure due to liquidity shortages. This finding suggests that 
the likelihood of shortterm fragility due to shortages will be reduced when deposit 
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ceilings are less restrictive.9 Regarding the other derivatives, it is clear that the 
viability of the asset transformation process directly relates to the intermediaries’ 
number and the deposit2supply elasticity. Therefore, it seems that increases in the 
depositreturn controls may increase the viability of the asset transformation process 
when the size of the deposit market is relatively big. 10 
 
The long2term control2risk derivatives are the following: 
( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
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Once more, the derivatives show that control2risk effects will depend on market 
structure. Only for the case of liquidity shortages, increases in deposit2return controls 
will clearly reduce the probabilities of financial failure. Increases in deposit2return 
controls may reduce the probabilities of failure in case of surpluses only if the size of 
the deposit market is small enough. 11   
 
We conclude by indicating that the behavioural and control2risk qualitative effects, for 
both models, are summarised in Table 5.3 in the text.   
                                                           
9 Deposit2return ceilings apply when they the regulated ceiling is below the non2regulated one. They are 
less restrictive the higher they are.  Notice that intermediaries do not have incentives to pay high 
deposit2returns.  
10 Analytically, this implies that the sign of the control2risk derivative 3A.7a is negative and that the 
ones of 3A.7b and 3A.7c are positive. Assuming that the size of the market is relatively small, these 
signs may change. In the latter case, the analysis will be identical to the one done for the behavioural2
risk derivatives 3A.1a23A.1d. 
11 Assuming that the size of the market is small enough, 3A.8b will be negative. This will confirm our 
previous indication regarding the qualitative similarities between the control2risk derivatives in this 
model and the behavioural2risk ones in the model with deposit2return controls. 
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4. Appendix for Chapter 6 
In this appendix we provide details regarding the statistical tests associated to the 
econometric study. Specifically, we include statistical tests to assess the robustness 
and functional form specification for all the regression models. The inclusion of these 
tests is necessary due to the absence of an econometric selection criterion to model the 
regression sets.12  
 
The specific robustness tests are based on the Gauss2Hermite sensitivity indicators13 
and the functional form diagnostic one is based on the Ramsey’s RESET test.14 Thus, 
the tests are regression2based ones. 
 
The appendix is divided in four sections. The former three sections include the 
regression2based tests associated to the financial structure, financial development, 
financial structure and development specifications, respectively. The fourth section 
                                                           
12 As indicated in the main text, our assessment approach assumes linear modelling specifications.  
Evidently our study can be criticised under these grounds. However, it is interesting to mention that 
discussions around the econometric modelling procedure are rarely, if ever, included in academic 
papers. Interestingly, none of the applied papers indicated in this chapter concerns with regression 
stability or functional form specification diagnostics. 
13 The Gauss2Hermite sensitivity indicators are used to check the quadrature approximation used in 
random2effects estimators.  Basically, the G2H indicators are re2estimations of the analysed regression 
model (and, particularly, the maximum likelihood estimator). The important feature of such re2
estimations is that they use, as starting point, the converged solution. Such re2estimations are evaluated 
for different numbers of quadrature points for comparative purposes. As a rule of thumb, if the re2
estimations show appreciable changes – greater than a relative difference of 0.01 with respect the 
reference estimation2 the realibalility of the reference estimation, and the robustness of the results, may 
questioned. A more restrictive criterion indicates that if the fitted quadrature coefficients do not change 
by more than a relative difference of 0.0001, the choice of quadrature does not significantly affect the 
outcome and the econometric results may be robust [See Stata help on commands]. Evidently, the usage 
of G2H estimators can be criticised on the grounds of the relatively ad hoc comparison criteria. 
Furthermore, they can be criticised on the grounds that the numerical techniques cannot distinguish 
between local and global maximum points.      
Here we include for each regression two re2estimations. We indicate the absolute and relative 
differences of each re2estimation with respect to the fitted model. Moreover, we include the sum of 
squared relative differences.   
14 The Ramsey´s RESET test detects specification errors by analysing regressions that include auxiliary 
regression variables. Under this test, such variables are the higher order powers of the predicted values 
from the original regressions. The variables are assumed to be proxy of unknown omitted variables. 
Methodologically, the for each regression included in the main text is conducted as follows:  
a) First we regress the dependent variable on the independent ones. Then we obtain the fitted values of 
the dependent variable ŷ. 
b) Latter we re2run the regression, including ŷ2 and ŷ3 as additional variables. 
c) Finally, we test for the joint significance of the coefficients associated to such variables. The null hypothesis 
of no specification error is rejected if the additional variables have significant explanatory power. 
 196 
includes the regression2based tests associated to the banking market structure and 
fragility hypotheses.  
 
4.A. Tests for the financial structure specification models
Here we include the tests for the regressions in the financial structure set [Table 6.8 in 
main text]. These tests are developed to support the conclusions regarding the 
relationship between financial structure and banking fragility. 
 
The robustness outcome assessments are summarised in the following table: 
 
Table 4A.1 Robustness Tests on the Financial Structure Specification 















Fitted Quadrature (12 points) 
Log Likelihood 214.22 216.02 217.41 216.92 
 
Comparison Quadrature (8 points) 
Log Likelihood 213.97 214.58 217.42 216.97 
Difference 0.2506 1.4357 20.0138 20.0536 
Relative Diff. 20.0176 20.0896      0.0007 0.0031 
 
Comparison Quadrature (16 points) 
Log Likelihood 214.52 216.14 217.51 216.88 
Difference 20.2963 20.1288 20.1030 0.0355 
Relative Diff. 0.0208 0.0080 0.0059 20.0021 
 
Sum of Squared 
Relative Diff. 
0.0007 0.0080 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Notes: The likelihood is computed using the Gauss2Hermite quadrature. The default number of points to 
use in the G2H quadrature for the models included in the main text is 12.  
 
 












Table 4A.2 Specification Tests on the Financial Structure Specification 











































































Observations 32 36 34 37 
LR2CHI2 12.91*** 14.82*** 26.77*** 11.51** 
Prob > chi2 0.0016 0.0006 0.0000 0.0214 
Log Likelihood 213.48 214.15 27.50 216.00 
u 2.19 4.63 1096.71 1.86 
 0.82 0.95 0.99 0.77 
CHI2  
(Ho: =0) 
4.58** 6.47** 20.57*** 3.36* 
Prob > chi2 0.0324 0.0110 0.0000 0.0668 
 
Specification Likelihood Ratio Test 
LR2CHI2 
(Ho: Ŷ2= Ŷ3=0) 
1.49 3.72 19.80*** 1.83 
Notes: The dependent variable is the banking crisis dummy. The auxiliary regression variables are the 
higher order powers of the predicted probability values from each original regression model. The null 
hypothesis of no specification error is rejected if the extra variables have significant additional 
explanatory power. The z statistics are given in parenthesis and are based on IRLS variance estimators. 
One, two and three asterisks indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. 
 
 
The tests suggest that the aggregate and the efficiency models are the best ones for 
econometric modelling. According to the robustness results, the less robust model is 
the activity one [See Table 4A.1]. Moreover, Table 4A.2 offers evidence that the null 
of no incorrect omission is rejected only for the size model. Interestingly, the 
proportion of the total variance , is significantly close to one in all the latter cases. 
This finding supports the adequacy of the random effects. Thus, we can conclude that 
the tests supports the conclusion, contained in the main text, that the evidence 
provides mixed evidence supporting the market2based and the service2based views, 
rejecting the bank2based one. 
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4.B. Tests for the financial development specification models  
Here we include the tests for the regressions in the financial development set [Table 
6.9 in main text]. These tests are developed to support the conclusions regarding the 
relationship between financial development and banking fragility. 
 
The robustness outcome assessments are summarised in the following table: 
 
 
Table 4A.3 Robustness Tests on the Financial Development Specification 















Fitted Quadrature (12 points) 
Log Likelihood 215.88 216.31 217.30 216.86 
 
Comparison Quadrature (8 points) 
Log Likelihood 215.86 216.30 217.24 213.90 
Difference 0.0219 0.0062 0.0587 2.9648 
Relative Diff. 20.0013 20.0003 20.0033 20.1757 
 
Comparison Quadrature (16 points) 
Log Likelihood 215.85 215.69 217.30 216.97 
Difference 0.0301 0.6154 20.0024 20.1063 
Relative Diff. 20.0018 20.0377 0.0001 0.0063 
 
Sum of Squared 
Relative Diff. 
0.0000 0.0014 0.0000 0.0309 
 
Notes: The likelihood is computed using the Gauss2Hermite quadrature. The default number of points to 


















Table 4A.4 Specification Tests on the Financial Development Specification 











































































Observations 32 36 34 37 
LR2CHI2 16.74*** 12.68** 32.71*** 18.13*** 
Prob > chi2 0.0022 0.0129 0.0000 0.0012 
Log Likelihood 211.56 215.22 24.53 212.69 
u 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.20 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.59 
CHI2 
(Ho: =0) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.46 
Prob > chi2 0.9997 0.9991 0.9996 0.4959 
 
Specification Likelihood Ratio Test 
LR2CHI2 
(Ho: Ŷ2= Ŷ3=0) 
8.65** 2.17 25.53*** 8.35** 
Notes: The dependent variable is the banking crisis dummy. The auxiliary regression variables are the 
higher order powers of the predicted probability values from each original regression model. The null 
hypothesis of no specification error is rejected if the extra variables have significant additional 
explanatory power. The z statistics are given in parenthesis and are based on IRLS variance estimators. 
One, two and three asterisks indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. 
 
 
The tests suggest that the activity model is the best one for econometric modelling. 
According to the robustness results, the less robust model is the efficiency one [See 
Table 4A.3]. Moreover, Table 4A.4 offers evidence that the former activity model 
does not require additional explanatory variables. Thus, we can conclude that the tests 






4.C. Tests for the financial structure and development specification models  
Here we include the tests for the regressions in the financial structure and development 
set [Table 6.10 in the main text]. These tests are developed to support the conclusions 
regarding banking fragility. 
 
The robustness outcome assessments are summarised in the following table: 
 
 
Table 4A.5 Robustness Tests on the Financial Structure and Development 
Specification 















Fitted Quadrature (12 points) 
Log Likelihood 215.44 215.85 216.88 214.92 
 
Comparison Quadrature (8 points) 
Log Likelihood 215.33 214.78 216.87 214.70 
Difference 0.1045 1.0641 0.0022 0.2198 
Relative Diff. 20.0067 20.0671 20.0001 20.0147 
 
Comparison Quadrature (16 points) 
Log Likelihood 215.26 215.98 216.88 215.20 
Difference 0.1706 20.1267 20.0021 20.2793 
Relative Diff. 20.0110 0.0079 0.0001 0.0187 
 
Sum of Squared 
Relative Diff. 
0.0001 0.0045 0.0000 0.0005 
 
Notes: The likelihood is computed using the Gauss2Hermite quadrature. The default number of points to 














Table 4A.6 Specification Tests on the Financial Structure and Development 
Specification 






























































































Observations 32 36 34 37 
LR2CHI2 13.06** 14.08** 17.53*** 26.66*** 
Prob > chi2 0.0228 0.0151 0.0036 0.0001 
Log Likelihood 213.40 214.52 212.12 28.42 
u 3.30 2.03 0.00 264.19 
 0.91 0.80 0.00 0.99 
CHI2 
(Ho: =0) 
2.75* 2.20 0.00 14.65*** 
Prob > chi2 0.0973 0.1376 0.9991 0.0001 
 
Specification Likelihood Ratio Test 
LR2CHI2 
(Ho: Ŷ2= Ŷ3=0) 
4.07 2.64 9.50*** 12.99*** 
Notes: The dependent variable is the banking crisis dummy. The auxiliary regression variables are the 
higher order powers of the predicted probability values from each original regression model. The null 
hypothesis of no specification error is rejected if the extra variables have significant additional 
explanatory power. The z statistics are given in parenthesis and are based on IRLS variance estimators. 
One, two and three asterisks indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. 
 
 
According to the robustness results, all the models are almost stable. Among them, the 
less robust model is the activity one [See Table 4A.5]. Table 4A.6 offers evidence that 
the null of no incorrect omission is rejected for the size and efficiency models. This 
fact justifies why we indicate that the evidence seems to reject the bank2based view, 
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instead of indicating that it seems to give slight support the market2based one [See 
Subsection 6.5.1].  
 
4.D. Tests for the banking market structure and fragility models  
Here we include the tests for the regressions that focus on market structure [Table 6.11 
in the main text]. These tests are developed to support the conclusions regarding the 
relationship between market structure and banking fragility. 
 
The robustness outcome assessments are summarised in the following table: 
 
 
Table 4A.7 Robustness Tests on the Market Structure Models 















Fitted Quadrature (12 points) 
Log Likelihood    	

 
Comparison Quadrature (8 points) 
Log Likelihood 

   	

Difference  	  
Relative Diff. 	 
  
 
Comparison Quadrature (16 points) 





Relative Diff.  	  
 
Sum of Squared 
Relative Diff. 
   
 
Notes: The likelihood is computed using the Gauss2Hermite quadrature. The default number of points to 
use in the G2H quadrature for the models included in the main text is 12.  
 
 








Table 4A.8 Specification Tests on the Market Structure Models 




















































































Observations 32 261 220 35 
LR2CHI2 13.06** 13.96** 19.40*** 12.73** 
Prob > chi2 0.0228 0.0158 0.0016 0.0260 
Log Likelihood 213.40 2124.89 2102.54 215.24 
u 3.30 3.51 3.34 0.00 
 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.00 
CHI2 (Ho: =0) 2.75* 59.47*** 50.08*** 0.00 
Prob > chi2 0.0973 0.0000 0.0000 0.9987 
 
Specification Likelihood Ratio Test 
LR2CHI2 
(Ho: Ŷ2= Ŷ3=0) 
4.07 0.32 5.15* 3.78 
Notes: The dependent variable is the banking crisis dummy. The auxiliary regression variables are the 
higher order powers of the predicted probability values from each original regression model. The null 
hypothesis of no specification error is rejected if the extra variables have significant additional 
explanatory power. The z statistics are given in parenthesis and are based on IRLS variance estimators. 
One, two and three asterisks indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. 
 
 
The tests suggest that the concentration model is the best one for econometric 
modelling. Econometrically, the regressions seem to be stable [See Table 4A.7]. 
Interestingly, Table 4A.6 shows that the null of no incorrect omission is rejected only 
for the domestic model. Moreover, the proportion of the total variance  is 
significantly close to one in most cases. Thus, the statistical tests seem to support the 
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